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thoughtful. The aim at making a volume accessible to the lay reader gen-
erally hits his mark: the tone of the major pieces is refreshingly casual, and 
often funny. Further, the story that the volume tells as a whole is informa-
tive and interesting, an extremely challenging mark to hit when collecting 
essays from diverse authors. In taking such a wide scope, it gives both 
beginners and experts food for thought. In a discipline that too often falls 
prey to silos and narrow questions, this series and this volume are wel-
come additions.
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Intellectual, Humanist and Religious Commitment: Acts of Assent, by Peter 
Forrest. Bloomsbury Academic. 2019. Pp. 208. $153 (hardcover).
BRENDAN SWEETMAN, Rockhurst University
When I was an undergraduate in Dublin studying the philosophy of reli-
gion, there was a student who would constantly invent radical views of 
God and creation in order to show that we could go beyond traditional 
accounts, solve stubborn problems along the way, and still arrive at an 
outlook that was plausible and defensible. Over tea and doughnuts, we 
argued fiercely about whether his strange views were (refreshingly!) origi-
nal and plausible, or outrageous speculations that served only to stimulate 
reflection about the nature of God and creation. The present book may be 
regarded as an extremely sophisticated version of this approach. Building 
upon Forrest’s earlier work, this study is an addition to the recent litera-
ture on fideism that we have seen in such thinkers as John Leslie and John 
Bishop, whose work follows the general approach of William James.
Forrest’s argument throughout is intricate and involved; there are lots 
of pieces, many of which (as he admits) can be described as speculations 
that are not very well developed, and, we must add, not convincingly 
defended. Nevertheless, the book exhibits complex philosophizing and 
clever insights, and offers what some will see as an intriguing set of sug-
gestions with regard to perennial issues. The author’s approach is a kind 
of hybrid of contemporary analytic philosophy and process philosophy, 
especially in the conception of God that emerges from these pages, for 
he suggests that initially god does not have a moral character but even-
tually develops into a being worthy of worship and so becomes God. In 
Chapters 1 and 2, Forrest starts from the position that he believes afflicts 
the modern intellectual world—the loss of “epistemic innocence,” where 
innocence refers to the state of believing without critical reflection. In 
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response to this loss of innocence, he proceeds to defend the following 
commitments: (i) to reason, by which he means ordinary human ways of 
seeking true beliefs; (ii) to humanism (which includes scientific realism); 
and (iii) to a God worthy of worship. He argues throughout the rest of 
the book that these positions are reasonable, and so one can commit to 
them, though he does not go so far as to say that it is unreasonable not to 
commit to them (so agnosticism, but not atheism, might be reasonable). 
Interestingly, he rejects reformed epistemology as a response to the loss 
of epistemic innocence for two reasons. The first is that the interpretation 
of religious experiences appealed to in reformed epistemology is always 
controversial and theory-laden, and the second is that we end up with 
religious pluralism on this approach since the Aquinas-Calvin model 
extends to any religion that teaches divine inspiration.
Under the influence of William James, Forrest argues in Chapters 3 
and 4 that reasonable commitment must satisfy three necessary condi-
tions, which he tentatively puts forward as jointly sufficient. These are 
(i) the dilemma condition: the circumstances of a commitment should be 
an intellectual dilemma, with good arguments for and against the thesis 
to which commitment is made; (ii) the pragmatic condition: we should 
only commit on matters that have good practical consequences; and (iii) 
the absolute superiority condition: the content of the commitment should 
be better than rival commitments. This last condition means that the the-
sis committed to is absolutely better than rival theses, not just better for 
an individual, but better without qualification. This condition also relies 
upon a notion called axiarchism (inspired by Leslie), the Platonist prin-
ciple that one—and perhaps the only ultimate—way of understanding 
is to be aware of the good, including the beautiful. This principle seems 
to apply particularly to theism, Forrest claims, and it may be conjoined 
with the rationalist principle that the understanding is the guide to truth, 
which relies upon ordinary human ways of knowing (which he describes 
as “core epistemology”; it includes inference to the best explanation and 
the principle of sufficient reason). Understanding, he suggests, is both an 
aesthetic experience and a guide to truth. Nevertheless, while one could 
agree that understanding might involve an experience that is somewhat 
aesthetic, and also that understanding can be a guide to truth, Forrest 
does not consider the fact that one may have the aesthetic experience 
from falsehood. He also denies that his arguments for the conditions end 
up being circular (since he appears to be using reason to argue for a com-
mitment to reasoning). One can appeal to the (dubious?) method of reflec-
tive equilibrium, he thinks, to ground one’s commitment in the sense that 
the judgments of particular cases both support and are supported by the 
general rules of reasoning, but there is no circularity in relying upon par-
ticular judgments prior to the formulation of the general rules. This reply 
is surely too brief and it is hard to see how Forrest avoids the charge that 
he is using reason to arrive at the three conditions and then having the 
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conditions justify a commitment to reason (along with the commitments 
to humanism and theism). Commitment to reason is further justified, he 
claims, because of its success in handling reality.
The absolute superiority condition is important for his overall case 
because he believes it enables us to avoid a pluralism of commitments 
based on different pragmatic considerations, which he takes to be an 
implausible position (one James ended up embracing). Pluralism is here 
understood to mean the view that different people with no relevant dif-
ference in experience, ability, or wisdom can reasonably reach opposing 
conclusions. Forrest claims that disagreements among intellectual peers 
are ultimately due to different judgments of value—the theist holds that 
her commitment is to the view with the most value. It is a reasonable 
commitment, and there is nothing more one can do to convince those 
who reject the value judgment. Our key disagreements are not therefore 
intellectual, even though we often mistakenly think they are. The author 
accepts that sometimes a commitment and a suspension of judgment can 
both be reasonable but, in most cases, he rejects pluralism and the absolute 
superiority condition is supposed to allow him to avoid sanctioning the 
reasonability of a pluralism of commitments.
His general position then (developed in chapters 5 and 6) is that these 
conditions in turn justify commitment to modified scientific realism, a 
commitment that acknowledges the fallible nature of science. However, 
commitment to naturalism is not reasonable because it requires atheism 
to support it, not the other way around. He appears to have no serious 
answer to the objection that we should commit to naturalism because of 
the success of science. A commitment to humanism then is also justified 
(and required) as a preliminary to his argument for theism. Commitment 
to humanism involves accepting five theses, in what seems like a 
Rawlsian fashion—we don’t have to argue for them, but they fit well 
with liberal sensibilities. These five theses are: (i) a commitment to abso-
lute values (there are things that are objectively valuable in themselves); 
(ii) some things are absolutely better than others; (iii) a commitment to 
freedom and moral responsibility; (iv) there is a human telos, which is 
to love and to understand; and (v) all persons are equal. This is what he 
means by humanism, with the telos not being understood in any specific, 
Aristotelian sense. Here, Forrest is open to a charge of relativism unless 
we already have a specific theory of value in place to define what love 
amounts to.
Although humanism is often regarded negatively by theists, Forrest is 
advocating religion within the bounds of humanism. The author consid-
ers objections along the way and argues that commitment to some ver-
sion of these five claims satisfies his earlier criteria, and so commitment 
to humanism (and then theism) overall is reasonable, given the balance 
of evidence. Secular humanism would involve the acceptance of two 
additional theses, belief in unaided progress and rejection of religion and 
the afterlife. However, secular humanism does not satisfy the absolute 
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superiority condition—there is nothing absolutely superior about living 
as if there is neither God nor an afterlife. If secular humanists deny this, 
they are stuck with pluralism and probably relativism as well (which 
Forrest has earlier rejected). And so, as long as theism can be shown to be 
reasonable (that is, it satisfies the dilemma condition), then it is better than 
atheism because of the absolute superiority condition.
In Chapter 7, the author develops the argument that we can move from 
humanist commitment to commitment to god, where god is the primor-
dial cosmic agent. He defends the existence of god by relying upon stand-
ard arguments from natural theology (which, though inconclusive, are 
still adequate for commitment). Influenced by the process approach, and 
also by a rejection of any radical dualistic separation of the mental from 
the physical, he regards god as an embodied cosmic mind who has aware-
ness of multi-universes, which are gradually reduced by divine action, in 
utilitarian fashion, to the best ones as a way of promoting the most good. 
Eventually, we evolve to a lawful universe and an objective moral order, 
both of which are accessible to reason. “The god,” he says, “will act in this 
way out of regard for what is good even though not yet bound by ethi-
cal rules” (127). Both axiarchism and the truth of theism explain why the 
universe ends up the way it does, he claims. Theism would also explain 
why our universe appears fine-tuned for life. He rejects the classical view, 
which he describes as “omni-God,” because it is very vulnerable to the 
problem of evil. He also rejects a mainstream process view because this 
conception of god is too weak. The way to reconcile these views is to spec-
ulate that initially god is not good enough to be God.
Forrest expands upon this speculative account in Chapter 8. There, he 
argues that given that god created the universe, it is plausible that god 
retains enough power to be God (that is, to be worthy of worship). The 
problem of evil is a serious objection to the claim that god could develop 
morally into a being that is worthy of worship. This problem can make 
commitment to theism seem implausible, and so the hypothesis of the-
ism may fail to satisfy the dilemma condition. The author claims that 
god is initially motivated by aesthetic considerations (and so creates 
a universe where god decides not to break the natural laws), but later 
develops a moral character in response to the creatures that emerge in 
creation. Only then does god welcome a relationship of mutual love 
with these creatures and so over time becomes God. The moral devel-
opment of the collective of humanity, and of free individual humans, 
are incommensurable values, and Forrest argues that our experiences 
show us that god most likely set up creation so that eventually it will be 
governed by certain values being promoted over others. These include 
free people eventually moderating their freedom in relationship with 
others, the aesthetic value of mathematically elegant laws admitting no 
exceptions, and great joy even if it takes a long time to arrive. The lesser 
(though not unimportant) values include the absence of suffering, the 
promotion of equality, and having a good life here and now. We should 
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think of god initially as acting in a utilitarian way, attracted mainly by 
aesthetic considerations, and promoting the overall good even if this 
allows acts of suffering along the way, until god later develops moral 
character.
Yet, Forrest seems to equivocate between saying god has no moral 
character, and saying that god does not have a morally perfect charac-
ter. There is another premise which he seems to just help himself to—
namely, that the reason god moves toward a moral character is because 
he is attracted to the good and repelled by the bad. We are not told why 
this is so, and it sounds as if god may have a moral character after all! It 
is troubling that his view is suffused throughout with an appeal to values 
to move it in the correct modern direction, but these values are never 
clearly justified. For example, the absolute superiority condition does not 
seem to me to work unless we first define what the good means. But why 
define it in one way rather than another? And can we utilize the concept 
without smuggling in a moral dimension (ours, of course, which would 
then define the way God must turn out)? Many will also find his response 
to the problem of evil unsatisfactory because it is difficult to accept god 
acting in any kind of utilitarian way. To defend such a view he is forced 
to speculate that initially god had no moral character, and also locked 
himself into a lawful universe (one in which he decided not to intervene) 
for aesthetic reasons (and so this would explain why there is so much 
evil), a position some will no doubt regard as throwing the baby out with 
the bathwater. Forrest completes the picture by suggesting that evil is not 
such that it makes any life not worth living, is compensated for in the 
afterlife, and that we should (and do?) forgive God for the earlier evils. 
The claim that all of this is supposed to be compatible with an embodied 
god also strains credulity.
Overall, Forrest needs too many premises and speculative hypothe-
ses, and several seemingly ad hoc moves to tell a coherent story. One 
struggles to see how the parts fit together, and there is a worry that sev-
eral slights of hand may be in play in the form of helping himself to 
values and claims that he does not justify. Some may regard this work as 
a valiant, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to defend a commitment 
to theism. Atheists may see it as whistling in the wind to save theism, 
given modern sensibilities which he accepts with little question, and 
which many theists would doubt (or at least modify). Many will find 
the argument speculative, unnecessarily complicated and, in its over-
all progression, too often anemic, perhaps to the point of bemusement. 
Yet, I found this book a challenging and entertaining jaunt that is both 
fascinating and full of genuine insight. It will likely not be convincing 
to many, and some may not have the patience to stay with it to the end, 
but I recommend it for an alternative view of many key questions that 
continue to fascinate in the philosophy of religion, especially concerning 
the nature of God.
